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 End of the Cyber Café’s Reign 
 Th e cyber café has been described as an intermediary of the digital divide 
(Bhan  2011 ). In 2007, basic connectivity through General Packet Radio 
Service prevailed in Kenya for the nation’s ten million mobile subscribers. 
Th ird-generation (3G) mobile telephony technology had yet to arrive, 
and mobile penetration stood at 28.97 % (CA  2009 ). In that year, two 
new cellular mobile operators were licensed. Telkom Kenya (now trading 
as Orange) and Econet Wireless with its brand yuMobile (TeleGeography 
 2007 ) got set to take on Safaricom and Celtel. In March of that year, 
mobile network operator Safaricom launched its mobile money transfer 
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service, M-PESA. By the end of the same year, a milestone of one million 
registered users was reached (Safaricom.co.ke  n.d. ). So began a transfor-
mative epoch for Kenya’s technology history. 
 In the developed world, one could consider the desktop computer 
as the gateway to the Internet—and perhaps even consider one’s email 
address as a “passport” to the Internet. In Kenya, these two things were 
available to those who had access and could aff ord the cyber café as a 
physical location with Internet access and desktop personal computers. 
 Cyber cafés were seen as commercial ventures for entrepreneurial 
Kenyans (Bhan  2013 ). Cyber café attendants charged for per-minute use 
of desktop personal computers. Mobile Internet, though developing, was 
not as widespread. 3G service only came to Kenya in 2008 (Wanjiku 
 2008 ) for Safaricom, 2011 for Orange (TeleGeography  2011 ), and 2012 
for Airtel (Mayton  2012 ). 
 Cyber café owners had seen the opportunity of connectivity and built 
on it. Th e list of services provided by cyber cafés included printing, lami-
nation, and binding as well as typing—be it learning how or paying an 
attendee to type one’s documents. It was not uncommon to see visitors 
charged to obtain an email address or open a profi le on a social network. 
Facebook, the global social networking site based in Palo Alto, California, 
was growing in popularity since its launch in 2004. Cyber cafés began to 
realize this and had an incentive to help create Facebook accounts and 
profi les to increase customer frequency and usage in time spent online. 
 Th at said, as the hard-wired Internet reached parts of rural Kenya 
by 2009 (Wyche et al.  2013 ), so came changes in how urban and rural 
Kenyans experienced connectivity. However, usage was not equally dis-
tributed countrywide. For low-income rural Kenyans, accessing the 
Internet at a cyber café or on an Internet-enabled mobile phone repre-
sented a signifi cant expenditure (Wyche et al.  2013 ) and Facebook was 
seen as a luxury. 
 Email became an important part of the cyber café ritual. Email was 
reported as the leading activity on the Internet (Ipsos Synovate  2011 ). 
Th e narrative of having an online mailbox to check for emails and using 
one’s email address to sign up to receive communication led to the ascent 
of cyber cafés. As mobile telephony developed and more aff ordable 
devices were launched into the Kenyan market, the cyber café industry 
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faltered. Cyber cafés, selling mobile broadband modems, would soon put 
themselves out of business with a key segment of their customer base, the 
casual or social browser—that is, those chatting on Instant Messaging, 
Facebooking, exchanging occasional emails, and so on—who seemed to 
cut down on their cyber visits. Th ey were the largest segment of people 
going online (Bhan  2013 ). 
 Connected Kenya experienced a tectonic shift in the following four 
years, thanks to the arrival of the fi ber optic cables. As slow and steady as 
the pace of growth was, M-PESA had taken off . Transfers on the mobile 
money network had reached Ksh. 23 billion by the time the fi ber optic 
cables made landfall in June 2009. Facebook’s growth by that time had 
seen 300,000 Kenyans users join (Lorica and O’Reilly Media  2009 ). 
With that, the net eff ects began to be felt in people’s wallets. Speeds were 
expected to increase and become more reliable, while prices, which had 
been constant with very little motion in the market, were expected to 
slowly drop, and then, to continue doing so. As Calestous Juma noted 
in an interview, “Th e speed that knowledge currently moves in Africa is 
5 mph — walking pace. But with decent connectivity, knowledge will 
travel at the speed of light” (Rice  2008 ). 
 Habits began to transform too. In just the fi rst 12 months after the fi ber 
optic cables made landfall, the Internet-access point of Kenyans started 
shifting from cyber cafés to mobile phones (Ipsos Synovate  2010 )—and 
the devices themselves were more widely available, with greater capacity 
to consume and connect to the Internet. 
 Th ese shifts came about thanks in no small part to transformative 
devices and device partnerships, such as the historic Huawei IDEOS 
mobile phone. When Google, Huawei, and Safaricom saw that mobile 
Internet use had grown 180 % in 2009–2010, they partnered to launch 
the IDEOS to accelerate this trend (Vota  2010 ). For Kenya, this was a 
watershed moment. Th e Android-powered touchscreen device sold more 
than 500,000 units (Okwii  2014 ). It was a true winner. 
 Priced at Ksh. 8500 (USD100), it came with 600 MB of data and Ksh. 
1000 (USD10) worth of talk time. Seven of every ten phones sold in 
February 2011 were Huawei IDEOS phones. In that quarter, the phone 
single-handedly had 45 % of market share in the smartphone segment 
as the most aff ordable smartphone in the market (Kemibaro  2011 ). By 
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August of that year, more than 350,000 units had been sold as the phone 
went on course to break the half a million mark (Talbot  2012 ). 
 Th e shift taking place was one of space, in a sense, the physical spaces 
of connectivity were shifting. It was moving from being dominated by 
the static settings of cyber cafés to an increasingly mobile-driven world 
that included feature phones, smartphones, broadband modems, and 
laptop computers. 
 When it came to where Kenyans were spending their time online, 
another shift was also taking place. By the beginning of 2012, social net-
working had replaced email as Kenyans’ number one activity on the Web, 
followed by entertainment, games, and music (Ipsos Synovate  2012 ). 
 It was now that online, too, a shift began to take place—that is, the 
spaces people were using to interact with one another. Th e key space was 
no longer the one built by email companies of the 1990s and 2000s, 
which  had email at their core (with online groups driven by email, early 
social networks such as MySpace, or instant messaging clients such as 
Yahoo Messenger). On Opera Mini, a leading mobile browser, Facebook 
now ranked as the Number One most visited website by Kenyan users, 
solidifying its position and growing popularity (Opera Software  2010 ). 
 A prophetic remark from the past was about to come to fruition. 
Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s founding president and the father of modern- 
day Pan-Africanism, famously said, “We face neither East nor West, we 
face forward.” For Kenya and the rest of Africa, at least for the connected 
class, a virtual manifestation of this was beginning to take place. 
 At the time, two Chinese technology companies, Huawei and Zhong 
Xing Telecommunication Equipment (China), were responsible for the 
telecoms infrastructures in 53 of 54 African countries (Zhongxiang 
 2011 )—underpinning the fact that the East has one way in on the connec-
tivity of Africans. Th ey also manufactured most, if not all, of the devices 
that have been used to connect to the infrastructure and the Internet. But 
if you look to where Kenyans have spent their time online, you fi nd that 
they look “West,” spending their time on Facebook, Google, and other 
websites that have their main headquarters in Silicon Valley. 
 To better understand social media’s growing infl uence, we need to 
examine the fi ve years following the arrival of the fi ber optic cables and see 
them in context through the lens of Twitter. Twitter began as a fl edgling 
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social network launched in 2006 at South by Southwest, an American 
technology and culture conference. Th e fi rst Kenyan on Twitter, accord-
ing to Digital Rand, a social media and blog tracking platform, is con-
sidered to be @kamuiri, a system administrator who signed up in March 
2007 (Digital Rand  2014 ). Th e social network then began in earnest, 
with a fl ock of early adopters, including a number of bloggers following 
suit. 
 M-PESA’s early adopters were “relatively upscale (and banked) male 
urban dwellers” (Omwansa et al.  2012 ). Twitter may have been no dif-
ferent. In M-PESA’s case, users were transmitting more than Ksh. 100 
million (about USD1.5 million) a day to their unbanked relatives all 
over the country, creating the very fi rst core of M-PESA’s users during 
the pilot phase, in 2007. 
 Twitter is perhaps best seen through the lenses of its hashtags over the 
years—each with its own description of a movement catalyzed and accel-
erated by the microblogging social network. Th ey have ranged from the 
melodic, the culturally transcendent, the evocative, the terrorizing, the 
resplendent, and the heartwarming. Each day, dozens of trending topics 
catch the attention of Kenyans on Twitter, and a number cross from the 
virtual world into shaping outcomes for Kenyans on Twitter, legitimizing 
them for the world, for their leaders, and for themselves. 
 The Backstory of Blogging and Kenya’s 
Content Creators 
 When it comes to Kenyan content creators, blogs trace back to an 
informal online community. Th e Kenya Bloggers Webring (KBW) 
was launched in 2003 by blogger Daudi Were of  mentalacrobatics.
com (Monitor  2015 ). It picked up the feeds of Kenyan authors online 
through Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds to help Kenyans read 
Kenyans—whether internationally or locally. Th ere were even awards, 
dubbed the “Kaybees,” given to members of the community and vari-
ous publishers (Were  2006 ). As searches became more dominant and 
Kenyans, whether in the diaspora or at home, made searches for con-
tent closer to home, content creators found their audience coming to 
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them. Searches of Kenyan topics became more likely to yield a variety 
of Kenyan-populated websites, including Kenya-focused message boards, 
forums, and even email listservs for those who still considered email their 
passport to the Internet. Th e largest Kenyan sites at the time blended the 
best of community forums and message boards with content sourced to 
spark conversations. In some ways, they could even be considered social 
networks (Obura  2009 ). 
 A frontrunner and innovator in this space was David Kobia’s  mashada.
com , which was considered to be Kenya’s most popular online forum, 
even being referenced as a news source (BBC  2008 ). It was a digital home 
away from home for Kenyans in Europe and the USA, with local con-
nected Kenyans frequenting the discussions. It had such importance that 
during the 2007–2008 post-election violence, it had to be shut down—
and was called “Kenya’s fi rst digital casualty”—for the vitriolic and heated 
ethnic discussions going on around politics in the contested elections, 
mirroring Kenyan society at the time (Hersman  2008 ). 
 With the rise of Facebook, Mashada’s star diminished as the almighty 
juggernaut of the globe took center stage. Th ough Mashada still had its 
faithful users, other diaspora-based message boards and websites com-
peted for the attention of the 3.2 million Kenyans in the diaspora and 
cannibalized its audience. 
 Of Twitter, it can be said that the Kenyan users of the microblogging 
social network site were early adopters and bloggers. A steady fl ow of 
prominent Kenyan bloggers joined at the time, and many are still iden-
tifi able by their original blogging identities and pseudonyms to this day. 
Th ey were seeking ways to use Twitter to build community outside of the 
existing comment sections, blogs, and email exchanges. For some, the 
purpose was to publicize their own content. Globally, it was not uncom-
mon at the time for bloggers to slowly trade their longer forms of writing 
and communication for the faster-paced world of 140-character tweets. 
 Th e years 2007 and 2008 were signifi cant in Kenya’s history. As the 
members of the diaspora tried to keep in touch with those on the ground 
in Kenya during the country’s post-election violence. Twitter was nota-
ble as one of the few sources where people sought the perspectives of 
Kenyans in Kenya. Th e news media and publishers were self-censoring or 
not representing the scale of the unrest. 
192 M. Kaigwa
 Ory Okolloh, with her digital space at  kenyanpundit.com , started 
with a blog post asking, “Any techies out there willing to do a mashup 
of where the violence and destruction is occurring using Google Maps?” 
(Okolloh  2008 ). Her readers, who were also fellow bloggers with whom 
she had interacted frequently in the blogosphere, responded. Th ree 
days later—thanks to David Kobia, also a blogger at  dkfactor.com ; Erik 
Hersman, a blogger at  WhiteAfrican.com ; and Juliana Rotich, a blogger 
at  Afromusing.com —Ushahidi was born (Goldstein and Rotich  2008 ). 
 Each of the founding members met because of their blogs. Th ey had 
chosen and built their own digital community online and connected 
beyond borders, thanks to blogging. For Ushahidi, Twitter soon became 
the platform’s input channel that it mapped across the world from crises 
to elections and emergencies. Ushahidi went on to make history as the 
quartet and the organization became a recognizable African technology 
brand—software for sifting through the complexities of multiple inputs 
from social networks, individual SMS texts, and other data points, all 
plotted geographically. 
 The Rise of Kenyans on Twitter 
 Looking at Twitter today, it is clear that it operates as Kenya’s virtual 
“town square” (Kaigwa and Wu  2015 ). Journalists now consider it to be 
a part of their beat, staying tuned to trending blogs and other updates. 
It has become common to see news broken on Twitter by a blogger—
whether a hobbyist, informed industry insider, or cyber-roving reporter 
pouncing on a story—legitimizing it (at times, plagiarizing it outright!) 
and publishing it in the Kenyan news media. At least once a week, each 
of the daily and weekly newspapers sources and quotes tweets and other 
comments from social media. 
 News bulletins on Kenyan radio and television networks often make 
specifi c calls to action, whether the broadcast is in Swahili or English: 
“Tweet us your views” or “Our hashtag is…” and similar phrases. Th ese 
are all appended to raise audience participation as announcers, newscast-
ers, and stations promote a call to action. Some brands have even come 
to expect that social media will be part of their advertising package, and 
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some Kenyan newspapers consider their social media audience as another 
channel for their clients’ digital advertising. 
 As of 2016, only fi ve of Africa’s 54 countries have their own list of local 
trending topics on Twitter. For Kenya, this milestone proved to be a nota-
ble transition in Kenyan cyberculture. Previously, the focus for Kenyans 
had been the rest of the world’s trending topics. If Kenya got a hashtag 
trending, it had to be on a global scale. During that time, when Kenyans 
referred to themselves as “trending,” it was inevitably synonymous with 
worldwide trending, because this was the only way to see the social 
proof—that is, on Twitter’s list of the “Worldwide Trends.” However, 
starting on April 11 (Cheng-Yue  2013 ), there was now an in-country 
“micro-mirror” showing the daily, hourly, and minute-by-minute trend-
ing topics of Kenyans. 
 Makmende: Meme, Muse, and Model 
 In 2010, an eclectic house/funk/disco band consisting of Daniel Muli, 
Jim Chuchu, Bill Sellanga, and Mbithi Masya learned in their own way 
how their personal networks could catapult them to becoming one of 
Africa’s fi rst viral Internet sensations originating from Kenya (McKenzie 
 2010 ). Known as Just a Band, the group had been releasing a genre- 
bending collection of electronic, funk, and Afro-pop hits for just over 
two years. Th eir next release, which launched in March 2010, would 
change African cyberspace. 
 Th e way that the band would raise awareness and create expectation 
for their singles was simple. Th ey would ask close friends to change their 
profi le pictures on social networks to an agreed-upon set of photographs 
prepared by the band. Th eir second single of their sophomore album 
“82” would be no diff erent (Justabandwidth  2010 ). Th e band shared 
cryptic status updates to be published by their respective friends pro-
moting “Ha He” proclaiming “Makmende Amerudi” (“Makmende Is 
Back”) featuring images such as those of Makmende, a fi ctional Kenyan 
superhero character, from the soon-to-be-released music video on the 
cover of GQ, TIME, and Esquire magazines. Th e profi le pictures and 
status updates created awareness and curiosity in the larger “degrees of 
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 separation” of friends of the band and in their social networks. Compared 
to their previous single, “Usinibore,” of 2009 (Justabandwidth  2009 ), 
there was greater expectation. “Ha-He,” with its blaxploitation theme, 
nostalgic fi lters, and quirky character references, drew urban Kenyans 
back to their upbringing in the 1990s and 1980s. 
 Th e music video was released in March 2010 and proved a roaring suc-
cess. Th e built-up anticipation led not only to viewership on the band’s 
YouTube channel, but soon to the establishment of Makmende as an 
Internet cultural icon, a meme, that others felt fully licensed to contribute 
to. Th e resonance of the video soon prompted other enterprising Kenyans 
to co-opt Makmende’s currency as a variety of individuals created “fan 
art” about Makmende while others created websites such as  www.mak-
mende.com , impersonating the brand and likeness of Makmende. Th ere 
was even a radio station that created a call-in game based on Makmende, 
all of which the band distanced themselves from, encouraging the trend 
to go on (BrandKemistry  2010 ). 
 Makmende’s seeming invincibility led to a longstanding trending topic 
on Twitter that catalyzed it all through the hashtag #Makmende, sparked 
by Kenyans who had watched the video. #Makmende was lit up by the 
world as a global trending topic, making Twitter’s top ten list for hours. 
It was viral. Across the world, Twitter users followed and joined in. Th e 
jokes about it took on a style perfected in Internet culture when referring 
to Hollywood martial artist Chuck Norris (Know Your Meme  2012 ). Th e 
recipe was to set up satirical factoids with absurdly exaggerated claims 
about Makmende’s toughness, invincibility, fi ghting style, and masculin-
ity. As the world chimed in with its comments, quips, and one-liners, the 
view count on the video rose and rose. 
 Kenyans on Twitter began to believe, following all the screenshots that 
were tweeted on the day, that no matter how few they were, they could 
not only get the digital ear of the world, but they could rally a global digi-
tal community to chip in. Th e Makmende phenomenon has been cited 
as an example of a transnational cultural fl ow originating in the Global 
South (Jenkins et al.  2013 ; Zuckerman  2010 ). Th e participatory playful-
ness around Makmende led to a “meme of aspiration” (Ekdale and Tully 
 2013 ), a meme through which a certain niche of Kenyans collectively 
reimagined a hypermasculine hero who could lead the country toward 
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political and economic stability at home, and cultural and technological 
dominance abroad. Here, Ekdale and Tully’s article ( 2013 ) drew from 
multiple texts about and within the Makmende meme, including videos, 
artwork, tweets, Facebook posts, blog messages, and news reports. 
 Makmende even featured in short fi lms about voter registration pro-
duced by Just a Band as part of their civic-action creative campaign 
Kuweni Serious (Kiswahili for “Get serious”) (Kuweni Serious  2010 ). 
From the fi rst few tweets to the front cover of the  Wall Street Journal 
online, the campaign made a historic statement in Internet culture. 
 Makmende also caused what would later be called a Wikipedia war, in 
which online editors deleted various attempts to create a Makmende page, 
citing rules such as copyright infringement, vandalism, or incomprehen-
sibility. Th e phrase “Makmende’s so huge, he can’t fi t in Wikipedia” was 
coined because the editors disagreed on whether the fi ctional character 
deserved a page. 
 Th is back-and-forth battle was characterized as one between inclusion-
ists and deletionists (Ford  2011 ). For the deletionists, Makmende was an 
imaginary character from a small African country. He did not deserve a 
Wikipedia page, because, frankly, no one in the English-speaking world 
would really care about him. Although he was big in Kenya, he was not 
notable enough to deserve an encyclopedia entry (Zuckerman  2010 ). 
 Digital Identity Spurs Drought Intervention 
 In July 2011, digital marketing executive Ahmed Salim began a per-
sonal initiative around an impending drought and famine facing Kenya. 
Th e drought was described as the most severe since 1995 (UN OCHA 
 2011 ) and was anticipated to be the worst in 60 years (BBC  2011 ). Salim 
started with a pair of hashtags, #Sacrifi ceAMealKE and #FeedKE, the 
latter of which he ultimately proceeded with. He noted that, a day after a 
plea to his timeline and followers, 58 people came forth to donate a meal 
to the Kenya Red Cross (Salim  2011a ). A week later, he had raised Ksh. 
140,880 from 172 people (Salim  2011b ). 
 As the campaign gained momentum, it was adopted by the Red Cross, 
which later turned it into a national public–private partnership (Kenya 
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Red Cross  2014 ). It was then launched into the public domain with 
a facelift, including a new title—#KenyansforKenya—and corporate 
 partners, including telecommunications company Safaricom and KCB 
Bank (formerly known as Kenya Commercial Bank). What started as a 
Twitter hashtag got people to act on their country’s behalf and grew into 
a historic nationwide campaign. 
 Th e result was a national conversation that traversed Kenyan society, 
with endorsements by celebrities and other noteworthy Kenyans and 
touching montages and songs composed by the country’s biggest artists. 
Th e giving was done by ordinary Kenyans, including individuals and 
institutions pledging to solve the crisis with their own local contribu-
tions. Th e campaign raised more than Ksh. 677 million, reaffi  rming the 
ability of Kenyans on Twitter to spark changes that touched the nation 
as a whole. 
 Snippets in Cyberspace Lead to Songs 
in Public Space 
 Also in 2011, spurred by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, civil soci-
ety groups in Kenya were inspired by conversations among Kenyans 
on social media, as they discussed what a local response similar to the 
Arab Spring might look like. From this, #Kenya28Feb movement was 
born. 
 Th e call to action for the hashtag that turned into a movement was 
based on Kenya’s national anthem. Th e anthem was originally composed 
as a prayer (Muindi  2015 ). Th e anthem is a common denominator for 
those who grew up singing it, hearing it, and committing it to memory 
as youth. For Kenyans of all faiths, ethnic backgrounds, interests, and 
socioeconomic backgrounds, the three verses of the national anthem were 
seen as a call for unity, not as an outright protest (Kenya 28 Feb  2011 ). 
 At 1:00 p.m. East African Time, Kenyans commemorated February 28 
on the fourth anniversary of the signing of the National Peace Accord. Th e 
Accord had followed Kenya’s 2007–2008 post-election violence, when 
the two principals formed what would become the coalition  government 
(National Accord and Reconciliation Act  2012 ). 
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 Kenyans of all walks of life tweeted their photos, recorded audios of 
their singing, and even convinced co-workers, staff , and passersby to 
pause and sing. Th e movement was hosted by Inuka Kenya Trust, a grass-
roots advocacy group founded in 2009 by journalist and former anti- 
corruption czar John Githongo. Th ese events went on to last for another 
year, with an even larger campaign beforehand, featuring recognized 
Kenyan athletes, media personalities, and others. 
 Medics Mobilize against Ministry before 
Masses 
 In October 2012, Dr. Christine Sagini, a Kenyan doctor and member of 
the Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Union, recounted how—
during negotiations between the union and the Ministry for Medical 
Services—Minister Peter Anyang Nyong’o had “called medical doc-
tors sulking children, crying for peremende” (Kiswahili for “sweets”) 
(K24TV  2012 ). After this exchange and a breakdown in the negotia-
tions, the doctors resolved to strike. “We’ll tell Anyang Nyong’o and 
the world exactly what kind of peremendes we want,” Dr. Sagini said in 
an interview with K24, a Kenyan television station. Irene Kimacia, the 
journalist on assignment, described the movement as “spreading like a 
bushfi re (online), with 3,000 doctors tweeting their experiences to the 
public” (K24TV  2012 ). 
 Th e title of the campaign was “Th anks for your taxes, here is a 
sweet” (Peremende Movement  2012a ). Th e name of the movement 
was a hidden reference to a certain Kenyan supermarket chain that 
was infamous for claiming to be out of loose change, particularly one-
shilling coins, and off ering shoppers their change in the form of sweets 
(Kajilwa  2015 ). Th e #PeremendeMovement struck a chord with the 
public through a well-coordinated attempt by doctors to tweet in sync 
and through infographics, blog posts, and media appearances chroni-
cling their challenges (Peremende Movement  2012b ). Th e  government, 
according to union Chairman Victor Ng’any, noted that after the pro-
test, there was good will from the government in their negotiations 
(K24TV  2012 ). 
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 Kenyans Online Make Their Voices Heard 
in Electoral Debates 
 Twitter was gaining in legitimacy as a channel for those willing to try 
their cases in the court of public opinion, rallying the public to engage 
and amplify their messages. 
 Th e 2013 election stood out because it was the fi rst one in which 
Kenya had a signifi cant number of social media users. More than 1.8 
million of Africa’s 50 million Facebook users were in Kenya (Colic  2013 ), 
and there were hundreds of thousands of Kenyans on Twitter, all follow-
ing and interacting with the candidates. Th e pre-election push ensured 
that voters were being courted in cyberspace ahead of the ballot. 
 Th e presidential debates stood out as an electoral event never seen 
before. Th e fi rst of their kind in the country’s history, the debates were 
geared toward putting the candidates before a global audience in cyber-
space, with broadcasts on 8 television stations, on 32 radio stations, and 
on YouTube. Th e debates generated buzz both before the live event and 
then during it, with speculations on whether there would be only six main 
candidates or the full eight running for offi  ce. Th e frontrunners preferred 
fewer candidates, selected on the basis of polling data, while the media 
organizers pushed for more candidates, arguably to dilute confl ict on-stage 
(Moss and O’Hare  2014 ). Anxiety crept in as it took a last- minute court 
decision to ensure that media organizers included fringe candidates lawyer 
Paul Muite and teacher Mohammed Dida. Th is court intervention further 
illustrated how contested and coveted the debate platform was, off ering—
especially for the minor candidates—free and unparalleled publicity. 
 When asked if the presidential debates made a diff erence, Kenyan politi-
cal analyst Kwendo Opanga remarked to the BBC that they had off ered 
smaller parties a chance to shine in the eyes of the public (Okwembah  2013 ). 
 Al-Shabaab versus the Administration: Twitter 
Amplifi es Terror during Westgate Attack 
 Later that year, the Westgate Mall attack would change the face of Kenyan 
history. At noon on Saturday, September 21, 2013, an agonizing attack 
began. Four gunmen associated with Al-Shabaab laid siege on the upscale 
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Nairobi mall. However, their real-world actions had ramifi cations both in 
cyberspace and in real spaces, leaving 67 dead, 175 injured, and a nation 
in mourning. 
 Th e attack proved a watershed moment on social media. On one 
side were the aggressors, the four Al-Shabaab gunmen inside the mall. 
Authorities, fi rst responders, and journalists descended on the scene 
but stood clear, with various security personnel going in. Th e public 
was put in a position not seen previously in terrorist attacks, watch-
ing through their phones and television screens as individuals trapped 
inside the mall sent updates into cyberspace. Some of these were pleas 
for help; others were messages to family or warnings to all who would 
see them. 
 Al-Shabaab, the terrorist group that claimed responsibility, was also 
online. Th e group had, as was common at the time, a pair of Twitter 
accounts, @HSMPress_ and @HSM_Press. From these accounts, 
members live-tweeted the siege and struck a chord of palpable fear. 
Th e exchanges in cyberspace involved the offi  ce of the President, the 
Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, 
Al-Shabaab, various journalists, and Kenyans on Twitter on, and away 
from, the scene. 
 At 1:28 p.m. Kenyan time on September 22, the Kenyan mili-
tary’s official Twitter account announced that most of those trapped 
inside had been rescued and that “most parts” of the mall complex 
were under control (Anzalone  2013 ). The claim that the attack was 
nearly over was disproved in the early morning of September 23, 
when an explosion rocked the Westlands district of Nairobi (where 
the Westgate Mall is located). Larger explosions followed in the early 
afternoon. The siege would not be over for another day. Twitter and 
members of the public were served through blogger Robert Alai’s 
timeline, as he found, verified, and tweeted updates on Westgate—
even tweeting against the Kenya Defense Forces Twitter account 
when he deemed it necessary (Alai  2013 ). Alai was praised by fellow 
Kenyans on Twitter and recognized by the press for his work during 
Westgate, apart from his divisive day-to-day persona as a blogger and 
critic (Stieber  2013 ). 
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 Private Developers Meet Match Thanks 
to Pupils, Protestors, and Pope 
 Coming back from their Christmas holidays, students at Langata Road 
Primary School found an unusual fi xture at their school. Th eir play-
ground was no longer theirs. Fenced off  with a stone wall and a green 
metal gate, it had been claimed by a private developer. Photojournalist 
and activist Boniface Mwangi, writing in a Facebook invitation to what 
he called the #OccupyPlayground protest, called the developers “pro-
fessional land grabbers acting on behalf of a very senior politician in 
the Jubilee government” (Mwangi  2015 ). Th e protest event, slated for 
January 19, 2015, was organized to donate sports equipment, according 
to the invitation, which received approximately 958 RSVPs from those 
who said they would attend. 
 On the day, clad in their green uniforms, students as young as 6 and 
as old as 14 joined Boniface and others protesting the land grab. In the 
group of attendees, placards with messages, such as “Uhuru government 
is protecting land grabbers,” could be seen. Even Member of Parliament 
Kenneth Okoth was in attendance, along with police in full riot gear, in 
case the situation escalated. What started as a chanting of slogans by the 
students and protestors developed into an animated shaking open of the 
developer’s gate and pushing down parts of the walls amidst loud cries 
and cheers. 
 Th e scene was volatile, and as protestors clashed with police, the police 
reacted by shooting tear-gas canisters into the crowd, sending the children 
scrambling. Th e scenes that followed were hard to watch—with children 
screaming, choking, and being rushed away amidst the clouds of smoke. 
 Skeptics judged the protestors, expressing cynicism for their use of 
the children, while opposition politicians tweeted shame on the govern-
ment. It took an apology and a visit from the Minister for Interior and 
Coordination of National Government Major General (Ret.) Joseph Ole 
Nkaissery (Honan  2015 ). Th e political pressure that followed led to the 
naming of the private developers by Lands Cabinet Secretary Charity 
Ngilu (Waruinge  2015 ). Th e Pope in his visit to Kenya in November 
2015 held a session with slum dwellers. He singled out land grabbing, 
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specifi cally admonishing faceless “private developers who even grab play-
grounds” and repeating the phrase “private developer,” which had been 
used extensively on Twitter and in the media (Simiyu  2015 ). 
 #SomeoneTell the World: Kenyans 
on Twitter Make Their Mark 
 However, when it comes to hashtags that engage the rest of the continent, 
nothing has quite had the longevity of the #SomeoneTell hashtag. Th is 
hashtag is many things, most often a rallying cry for the country to put 
away digital divisions, cultural contrasts, and diff ering opinions—a call 
to arms that has Kenyans ready with their data bundles, Wi-Fi hotspots, 
keyboards, and keypads prepared to take digital aim at the latest target. 
 Th e fi rst major instance of the hashtag’s use was that of 
#SomeoneTellCNN, in March 2012. On March 5 of that year, #Kony2012, 
an online campaign and viral advocacy video by the American nonprofi t 
advocacy group Invisible Children, was launched. Th e campaign urged 
the American public to use social media to put pressure on US lead-
ers and celebrities in a bid to make guerilla group leader Joseph Kony 
“famous” (Invisible Children  2012 ). Described as the fastest-growing 
viral video of all time, the fi lm reached 100 million views in 6 days, 
and 3.7 million people pledged support (Invisible Children  2012 ). Th e 
response was a tidal wave of headlines, attention, and spotlights shown 
onto Uganda from the USA and the West. Th is was not without Africans 
online voicing their opinions, many of them fi nding #Kony2012 factu-
ally inaccurate, an oversimplifi cation of a complex confl ict, with a call to 
action that removed agency from those actually on the scene and on the 
ground in Gulu, Northern Uganda. Th ere were also cries that the cam-
paign was fraught with a “white savior complex,” speaking to a Western 
predisposition to see and accentuate stereotypes about the continent’s 
narratives of helplessness in the absence of interventions from foreign 
(i.e., Western) partners. Nigerian author Teju Cole famously wrote about 
Kony 2012, criticizing the backers’ culture for supporting brutal policies 
in the morning, founding charities in the afternoon, and receiving awards 
in the evening (Cole  2012 ). 
202 M. Kaigwa
 Members of the African diaspora and signifi cant numbers of local 
Africans decried the campaign (Jardin  2012 ), aiming not to let America 
and the world buy into its one-sided rhetoric. Outspoken Ugandan dias-
pora member TMS Ruge wrote an opinion piece in the  New York Times 
to challenge the claims that Kony 2012 was a revolution (Ruge  2012 ). 
 #SomeonTellCNN: Where It All Began 
 Even without the headlines and exchanges of #Kony2012 having ceased, 
Uganda’s neighbor, Kenya would have a case of its own to answer on 
the world stage. On March 11, 2012, CNN’s East Africa correspondent 
David McKenzie fi led a story about a grenade attack at a bus terminal 
in Nairobi that killed six people and injured more than 60 (BBC  2012 ). 
When the story went on air on the CNN International channel, anchor 
Jonathan Mann stood in front of an animated Kenyan fl ag emblazoned 
with the headline “Violence in Kenya.” Th e fl ag and coverage of the 
story were interpreted as a skewed misrepresentation of the facts, because 
Kenyans were the victims of terror, not the perpetrators of it. And so, 
#SomeoneTellCNN was born (Wamathai  2013 ). 
 Th e narrative behind CNN’s coverage harkened back to various depic-
tions of Kenya strung across international media during the 2007–2008 
post-election violence. Th e same Kenyans who were connecting in cyber 
cafés at their leisure in years past were faced with experiencing or view-
ing on their TV screens as the world watched Kenya in chaos. A local 
media ban muzzled the Kenyan press from reporting on the post-election 
violence as it occurred but international media covered it extensively. 
Meanwhile, hateful SMSes were exchanged through mobile networks 
among Kenyans, thanks to mobile telephony (Goldstein and Rotich 
 2008 ). Th e country sank into a dark part of its history. 
 Kenyans tweeted the broadcaster and the journalist, thereby creating 
another global trending topic. #SomeoneTellCNN was profane, pro-
found, and piercing. Armed with satire, humor, facts, examples, and 
occasional insults, Twitter users made the case—globally—that the news 
report was a mistake and that their country deserved an apology. Th ey 
got it. David McKenzie, the journalist who fi led the story, was the fi rst to 
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apologize to Kenyans on Twitter, with a tweet acknowledging the inac-
curacy of the reporting (McKenzie  2012 ). 
 For Africans who participated and joined Kenyans in calling on CNN 
for an apology, perhaps it was also fueled by the concurrent #Kony2012 
campaign discussions that disgruntled both local Africans and the dias-
pora. A place to vent frustration in the transient ebb and fl ow of Twitter 
trends, buoyed by the energy and agency of the young, connected con-
tinent on display for the world to see. #SomeoneTell was on its way to 
becoming a hallmark of Kenyans on Twitter. 
 #SomeoneTellAfrica: Kenyans 
in Continental Combat 
 Kenya began to use the #SomeoneTell hashtag to combat other digital deni-
zens in African countries. Th e list is lengthy. Kenyans, if asked, perceive that 
they have a 100 % record of defeating foes large and small. Th ese “cyber-wars” 
are often born out of news stories that broke on traditional media or in online 
publication. In the case of #SomeoneTellUganda, an article insinuated that 
Kenya’s President-elect Uhuru Kenyatta was actually a Ugandan. Th e story 
even carried a congratulatory message from the King of Bunyoro, Solomon 
Gafabusa Iguru, to his “cousin” Uhuru after he was confi rmed as president. 
A newspaper carried pictures of relatives who looked like Kenyatta and even 
ran a follow-up story on how Jomo Kenyatta might have been Omukama 
Kabarega’s son. Kenyans were livid and tweeted insults and memes, launch-
ing whatever they could to attack Ugandans on Twitter (Wambui  2013 ). 
 Another example is Botswanan Foreign Aff airs and International 
Cooperation Minister Phandu Skelemani, who warned the President- 
elect not to set foot in Botswana should he refuse to cooperate with the 
International Criminal Court (Wambui  2013 ). Kenyans on Twitter (known 
as KOT) took this hard and started the hashtag #SomeoneTellBotswana 
to defend their president and country. Th e uproar forced Skelemani to 
retract his statement and state that Kenya and Botswana would continue 
having a good relationship (BBC  2013 ). 
 #SomeoneTellZimbabwe serves as a cautionary tale about the matu-
rity of the hashtag. A Kenyan website with a quote from Zimbabwean 
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President Robert Mugabe describing Kenyans as thieves touched a 
nerve of Kenyans (Spectator  2015 ). Th e resulting hashtag war with 
Zimbabweans began, only for Kenyans to realize that the article had 
been on a satirical website—something that had been clear all along to 
Zimbabweans on Twitter (known as Twimbos) (African Exponent  2016 ). 
A  New York Times article by East Africa bureau chief Jeff rey Gettleman 
used the Mugabe quote in a damning article about corruption in Kenya’s 
society—and a retraction was later issued when it emerged that even he 
had been duped (Gettleman  2015 ). 
 Th e hashtag was also used to send a message to the highest offi  ces 
in the land; #SomeoneTellUhuru and #SomeoneTellKagame, for exam-
ple, aimed to speak clearly to the heads of state in Kenya and Rwanda, 
respectively. American televangelists have been particularly notorious in 
some of their inaccurate statements, caught on video, about Kenya and 
have issued apologies and messages of reconciliation after encountering 
thousands of tweets correcting them (e.g., #SomeoneTellTDJakes and 
#SomeoneTellPatRobertson). 
 #SomeoneTellCNN: Election-Fever Brings CNN 
 In 2014, CNN’s new East Africa correspondent Nima Elbagir fi led her 
story “Armed and Ready to Vote” (Elbagir  2014 ), featuring a would-be 
militia group training and ready to defend themselves with what Elbagir 
described as “guns fashioned from iron piping, homemade swords, and 
bullets bought from the black market.” She and the television network 
would draw the wrath of Kenyans on Twitter, Africans, and others 
worldwide. 
 Speaking with the chalk-faced leader of these militiamen rolling around 
doing somersaults on the ground and “ready for war,” Elbagir thought 
she had found her big scoop and big break. Her prediction: Violence 
in Kenya’s election. Th is was the second strike for CNN, and they were 
pronounced guilty once again. #SomeoneTellCNN was back and just 
as vicious as before. A storm of tweets arose, aimed at the broadcaster 
and the journalist in question. Th e diff erence, this time, was that a new 
precedent was about to be set—offl  ine. Dr. Bitange Ndemo, Permanent 
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Secretary in the Ministry for Information and Communications at the 
time, relayed news from a National Security Committee meeting that 
morning with intelligence chiefs. He called CNN’s coverage “stage- 
managed”—a claim that CNN would later refute in its written apology. 
Ndemo said that CNN had planted the story in its international news 
and that the Kenyan government would protest vociferously, viewing 
it as irresponsibility of the highest order in a world news organization. 
He promised to write to CNN’s world news headquarters to protest the 
piece, calling it propaganda that was causing chaos and expressing hope 
that CNN would retract it (Kenya Citizen TV  2013 ). Th is was the fi rst 
time that the government had weighed in on a matter of national security 
inspired by and stoked on Twitter. 
 #SomeoneTellCNN: Presidents Set New 
Precedent against Media 
 Th e year 2015 saw the third and possibly fi nal “strike” for CNN—set on 
the largest stage so far. US President Barack Obama was set to grace the 
Global Entrepreneurship Summit, taking place in Kenya—and Kenya 
was preparing to welcome back its “son of the soil.” 
 CNN America began its reportage with a Web story and initial tweet 
with the words “President Barack Obama is not just heading to his 
father’s homeland, but to a hotbed of terror” (CNN  2015 ). Th is remark 
was followed with CNN’s television broadcast and picked up by Kenyan 
observers in the diaspora and online. Th e phrase “hotbed of terror” was 
contested, even as it fi rst appeared in numerous angles of coverage from 
CNN. It was repeated and appeared in text and in speech several times 
by various pundits and news anchors on the network. Th e live feed of 
the broadcast could not be watched in Kenya, but the screenshot sailed 
back and landed on the timelines of connected Kenyans, begging for a 
response. Th e onslaught of tweets made the global broadcaster modify 
the headline and opening of its story (Mullin  2015 ) away from “terror 
hotbed” to “father’s homeland” (Hopkins  2015 ). 
 While there is no denying that there was some truth to the phrase, the 
description and outright characterization of the country as a resembling 
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other global terror hotspots was a stretch (Mutiga  2015 ). Kenya had suf-
fered a string of atrocities by the Somalia-based terror group Al-Shabaab, 
but most of Kenya did not resemble the parts of the world where terror 
attacks are commonplace, and the phrase was hence interpreted as reduc-
ing all the complexities of Kenya into a single narrative. 
 As the hashtag #SomeoneTellCNN was reactivated once again, it was 
fi lled, this time around, with imagery and memes showing the country’s 
diversity, beauty, landscapes, and urban life as Kenyans sought to counter 
the narrative with positive storytelling and captivating imagery. Kenyans 
on Twitter also got smarter with humor, satire, and quips making their 
case against CNN and its gaff e by ridiculing the broadcaster. Th e state of 
America was put under scrutiny, too, as the contradictions of US life were 
highlighted, including issues such as gun violence. 
 Kenyan media owner and industrialist Chris Kirubi proved to be one of 
the most popular commentators early on. Challenging CNN, he praised 
the country’s local investment opportunities, some of which he was going 
to be showcasing during the Global Entrepreneurship Summit. His key 
tweet was among the fi rst to go viral: “Unless you are the one bringing 
the terror, we are a hotbed of investment opportunities & great people” 
(Kirubi  2015 ). 
 Th e word “hotbed” made its way famously across cyberspace. Kenyans 
on Twitter rallied to show, through tweets, pictures, and videos, that their 
city was safe and the country had more to it than a headline. It also 
became a topic during the summit as “hotbed” was mentioned in two 
speeches from two diff erent heads of state. President Uhuru Kenyatta, 
when opening the Global Entrepreneurship Summit, said that Kenya was 
a “hotbed of vibrant culture, natural beauty, and infi nite possibility” to 
the audience’s applause (Kenyatta  2015 ). Th e Global Entrepreneurship 
Summit’s opening plenary session saw each keynote speaker react to 
the CNN headline. President Obama, President Kenyatta, and Julie 
Gichuru, the master of ceremonies, took turns at rewriting the head-
line, with President Obama adding that Kenya is a hotbed of innovation. 
Kenya was also referred to as a hotbed of entrepreneurship and of invest-
ment opportunity (Clarke  2016 )—colossal endorsements that fl ew in the 
face of the original media story and implicitly sent a nod to Kenyans on 
Twitter. 
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 Th e government chose to issue a response as well. Th e highest- 
ranking intelligence offi  cer in the government, Major General (Ret.) 
Joseph Nkaissery, the Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Interior and 
Coordination of National Government, spoke on the issue. At a press 
conference where he spoke in Kiswahili, he called the coverage “lies,” 
describing the network’s message as “propaganda” and ending by inviting 
an apology from CNN (Capital FM Kenya  2015 ). He would later be 
quoted as having termed CNN’s actions a sustained campaign to portray 
Kenya in a bad light and its reportage as demonstrating irresponsibility 
and smacking of arrogance (Angira  2015 ). By then, it was not just the 
thousands of tweets that CNN would have to answer, but to the govern-
ment of Kenya itself. As part of the fallout, a USD1 million advertising 
contract between Kenya and CNN was suspended (Murumba  2015a ). 
Th e Kenya Tourism Board also said it was reacting to “misrepresentation 
of the country’s status” (Murumba  2015b ). 
 After the Global Entrepreneurship Summit, CNN sent one of its 
highest- ranking offi  cers, Tony Maddox, to Kenya. Th e executive vice 
president and managing director for CNN International paid a personal 
visit to President Uhuru Kenyatta to deliver the network’s apology in per-
son. He said, “Th ere is a world at a war with extremists; we know what 
a hotbed of terror looks like, and Kenya isn’t one.” He expressed regret 
and talked down any notion of the story as had been created in bad faith 
(Mutiga  2015 ). President Kenyatta, as part of his statement on their meet-
ing, mentioned his disappointment and explained to Mr. Maddox why 
“Kenyans, as expressed by those on Twitter, were so angry” (Mutiga  2015 ). 
 Conclusion 
 Twitter remains for us a lens to view connected Kenyans as a whole. Th e 
nation’s sense of belief in the power of technology to bring about change, 
shift dialogue, and present a narrative now plays out both on a smaller 
stage for local trending topics and sometimes on the larger stage of the 
world as a whole. 
 Each day, as Kenyans wake up, they receive the mainstream media 
with its headlines and news. Th ey also have Twitter’s list of local  trending 
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topics—an algorithmically generated service that takes popular and 
emerging trends and showcases them. While Kenya may no longer trend 
globally as much because of this, there is now a local lens to study the 
habits of connected Kenyans at a far more granular level. 
 As became clear while researching and creating the A–Z of Kenyan 
Twitter website, a need remains for exploring and understanding the 
depth and breadth of Pan-African digital society and culture (Kaigwa 
and Nendo  2014 ). Th e pace of which African nations with local trending 
topics such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Algeria, and Egypt 
continue to create cyberculture invites examination. Th e role of the 
mobile phone has ensured a place for Twitter in Kenyan hearts, minds, 
and headlines (Nzomo  2014 ), but the journey is far from over. What new 
paradigms will arise with the African uptake of new social media plat-
forms? What is to be said of a world where social media “self destructs” 
akin to image-based messaging app and social network Snapchat? Digital 
dictionaries such as A–Z of Kenyan Twitter can be considered as emerg-
ing media formats to guide locals and internationals to provide greater 
African context and perhaps even lead to greater global understanding. 
 What of a world where visual social media dominates the 
globe and challenges stereotypes? In 2015, the Twitter hashtag 
#Th eAfricaTh eMediaNeverShowsYou brought forward the work of 
Instagram users, both professional photographers and hobbyists, with 
pictures of African capital cityscapes and vignettes of life on the con-
tinent that challenged Western media and global stereotypes of disas-
ter and catastrophe (Banning-Lover,  2015 ). Will we see less of these as 
Africans evolve with the social media and mobile times? 
 WhatsApp, the instant-messaging application, which is owned by 
Facebook, can be considered to be the future of social networking, having 
been built entirely around the mobile phone, contacts, and minimal data 
usage. WhatsApp can take the place of Kenya’s largest social network—
despite its appearance as an instant messaging application. Th is shift from 
its perception and packaging as an instant messaging mobile app to an 
informal social network was predicted as a key trend for Kenya’s social 
media evolution (Kaigwa et  al.  2014 ). Th e app will take on a greater 
role as a pseudo social network made up of groups and potentially busi-
nesses in 2016 and beyond (WhatsApp Inc.  2016 ). More mindful work, 
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targeted at a profound understanding of Africa’s cyberculture, is needed 
to answer these and many more questions that will allow us to better feel 
the pulse of contemporary society. 
 And thus has the paradigm fully shifted from cyber cafés to mobile 
phones and, from there, to the niche network Twitter, which presently 
remains a leading public platform in Kenya’s digital economy. While 
the platform faces a tough time in determining its future in the USA 
(Constine  2016 ), its prospects in Kenya—and Kenya’s belief in it—
remain bright, even though it as no guarantee on its position. 
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 Conversation #7 
 Toward Digitizing Information 
for the Benefi t of the Many Rather 
Than the Few 
 Munyutu Waigi of Umati Capital 
 Munyutu Waigi  was raised in Mombasa and left for England when he was 13 
years old. Th e technology bug bit him when he worked in information technol-
ogy (IT) support for the Williams Formula One racing team as part of his four-
year degree program at London ’ s Brunel University ,  where he studied 
information systems. After graduating ,  he joined the global management con-
sultancy Accenture ,  working in communications and high tech. Th e urge to do 
something much bigger that would challenge him became overwhelming — and 
he decided to quit three months short of his three-year anniversary at the ﬁ rm. 
He moved back to Mombasa to start all over again and set up MoComm 
Wireless ,  a Wi-Fi company. About year and a half later ,  he ﬁ nally got his big 
break. Along with Leandro Sanchez ,  he co-founded Rupu ,  a group buying web-
site that has become Kenya ’ s largest e-commerce ﬁ rm. Two years later, Munyutu 
cashed out and used the funds to start his life ’ s true work :  And that is pretty 
much the beginning of Umati Capital. 
 Munyutu, what is the story behind Umati Capital? 
 In a nutshell, Umati Capital is an innovative tech-based lending insti-
tution. We primarily lend to processors and exporters across the agri-
culture sector. Umati provides working capital, invoice discounting, and 
supply chain fi nancing solutions to bridge challenging 30-, 45-, 60- or 
90-day payment terms faced by suppliers. 
 How does the digital solution work in practice? 
 Take, for example, the coconuts value chain. Th ere is the farmer who 
grows the coconuts, and in turn, sells them to a processor–exporter 
who extracts value and sells the compressed oil to international buyers 
across the USA and UK. Having purchased coconuts from hundreds of 
farmers, the processor–exporter has usually less than 30 days to settle 
the debt—but unfortunately has to wait 45 days to receive payments 
from his or her international buyers. Th is leaves a funding gap that the 
processor–exporter has to plug. Instead of approaching banks, which 
require collateral and lengthy processing times, the processor–exporter 
has Umati Capital as a premier solution provider. Unlike banks, Umati 
Capital does not require collateral to lend to the processor–exporter. 
Furthermore, we off er technologies, such as mobile and web apps, that 
help digitize the processor–exporter’s purchasing process, which is usu-
ally very manual. All in all, Umati Capital off ers seamless fi nancing 
along with innovative technology—a value proposition most banks 
can’t match. 
 How will your solution aﬀ ect the agribusiness value chain? 
 According to recent statistics, there are 700 million people across 
Africa engaged in agricultural activities. Th at is seven-tenths of Africa’s 
population, considering recent estimates of just over a billion people. 
Th is is further compounded in Kenya, where statistics have shown that 
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agriculture contributes 25 % of the Kenyan gross domestic product 
(GDP). Surprisingly, only 4 % of bank lending supports this key pillar in 
our economy. Why? Perhaps it has a lot to do with the fact that the key 
actors (farmers) do not have credit profi les—the basis of most structured 
lending—that would give traditional lenders comfort in their economic 
activity. 
 How is Umati Capital addressing this issue? Th e majority of assistance 
(international and local) to the agricultural sector has been tackling the 
issue from ground up. At Umati Capital, we believe the opposite: Th e 
issue has to be tackled from the top down. You can argue that there are 
several reasons why farmers rarely get paid in full and on time. We believe 
that by fi rst tackling the structured value chains—by improving working 
capital across them—you can learn key lessons around using technology 
to streamline their processes before moving on to the larger challenge—
the unstructured value chains. 
 What has been one of your biggest “Aha!” moments while working 
with Umati Capital? 
 Unfortunately, the life of an entrepreneur is fi lled with many unpre-
dictable moments. Th ere are countless “What just happened?” moments 
that leave you trying to make logical sense of events. I have concluded 
that luck and the right timing play a crucial part in my daily struggle. 
 My biggest “Aha!” moment came at the seed investment stage of 
Umati Capital. Like most startups at that stage, we barely had any 
cash and we rode purely on futuristic ideas about how Umati Capital 
would shape the lending sector in the years ahead. Th anks to the pow-
ers that be, we eventually closed an investment round with Accion 
Venture Labs worth USD400,000, at a valuation of USD1.4 million. 
What started off  as a dream to change the way small and medium-
size enterprises in Africa access working capital had suddenly become 
a funded idea. I guess the scale and reality of what we were doing 
crystallized further in 2015, when we were recognized by Citigroup, 
 Forbes magazine, MIT, and the MasterCard Foundation, among many 
global names. 
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 One of Kenya’s own technology entrepreneurs who is also an inves-
tor in Umati Capital, Joseph Mucheru, has been appointed to the 
position of cabinet secretary in the Ministry of Information and 
Communications. What does this mean for the tech community? 
 First of all, Joe is an all-round good guy. He is unlike most who have 
achieved success at his level. His humility, coupled with his calm dispo-
sition, lets him work with people across diff erent spectrums and back-
grounds. I fi rmly believe he is the best person for the job. Joe is Google’s 
former Sub-Saharan Africa lead, based in their Nairobi offi  ce. He was 
Google’s fi rst Sub-Saharan employee and was key in setting up Google’s 
presence in Africa from 2007. Before joining Google, he worked in vari-
ous roles, including chief technology offi  cer and chief executive offi  cer 
(CEO), at Wananchi Online (the leading provider of aff ordable enter-
tainment and connectivity for East Africa’s rapidly growing middle class), 
a company he co-founded in 1999. 
 What does Joe’s appointment mean for the tech community? As much 
as the technology community is about creating scalable enterprises, we 
also want to see government changes aimed at the greater good of the 
nation. We believe Joe’s vision and character can help create such an 
environment. 
 What are some of the key areas that need to be digitized by the 
government? 
 Th e overarching goal should be to achieve transparency through tech-
nology. Th e process of getting your ID card, passport, driver’s license, 
National Hospital Insurance Fund card, or National Social Security Fund 
card needs to be digitized as soon as possible. By digitizing these pro-
cesses, you will eradicate most of the daily corruption in the system. We 
also need to start digitizing basic government services in order to make 
those processes more transparent, less corrupt and, by that, more effi  -
cient. Another aspect is security. If you commit an off ense in Nairobi, for 
example, two weeks later in Mombasa, the police will have no knowledge 
of your off ense. Digitizing our security forces, beginning with the police, 
in a way that signifi cantly minimizes corruption would be marvelous. 
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 Why is the power of technology best deployed to combat corruption? 
 At least once a week, there is a new corruption case that is opened up, 
and the annoying part of it all is that no one will be taken to jail. It is 
immensely frustrating! If we can put technology on the agenda that can 
actually minimize corruption by introducing new, transparent processes 
together with government leaders who own the process, then we are hav-
ing a substantial impact on the lives of Kenyans. It is through technology 
and digitizing basic processes that we can transform Kenya in the shortest 
time possible. 
 Th ank you, Munyutu! 
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